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Background
Suppose that a force of "hiders" has an area A avail-
able within which to hide from a force of "seekers." Each side
can distribute its forces arbitrarily within A. If the density
of seeker effort at the location of any given hider is s, then
the hider is assumed to escape with probability f (s) , where
f(s) is some decreasing, convex function of s. The hiders
want to maximize the probability of escape, and the seekers
want to minimize it. If no further constraints are imposed, it
is not difficult to show that each side should allocate its
forces uniformly throughout the region, and that the escape
probability as the value of a two-person zero sum game is
f(S/A), where S is the total amount of seeker effort. Our
object in this report is to investigate the impact of constraints
on the motion of the hiders. Specifically, we want to investi-
gate what happens if the hiders are required to visit a
particular point (a port, typically) on the boundary of A
every t, while never travelling at a speed exceeding v.
1
We can anticipate that the escape probability will be f (S/A)
when the product vt is "large," and when vt is "small."
In order to simplify the analysis, the following assump-
tions are made
:
a) the region is a circular sector (wedge)
b) the revisit point is at the apex of the wedge
c) f (s) = 1/(1 + s) .
In Figure 1, the heaviness of the shading indicates the density
of seeker effort for a typical seeker strategy. Note that the
effort is dense in the vicinity of the apex, since the hiders
must all transit through that area in order to visit the apex.
A typical hider "tour" is shown. The hider basically picks
a direction at random and a range from a distribution introduced
in the next section, goes to the point and stays in the vicinity
of that point until it is time to return to the apex. Each
hider picks an independent tour after each visit to the apex.
Results
Let
9 = angle of the circular sector
r
_
= radius of the circular sectorsec
2
A = © r
sec/ 2 = area of sector
v = hider speed
t = revisit time
r
max
= vt//2 = maximum range of the hiders
2
S = total amount of seeker effort
Y = S/(0 r 2 )
max
U = r /r
sec max
The value of the game (escape probability) depends on the
two dimensionless quantities Y (a normalized amount of seeker
effort) and U (a normalized sector size); call it P(U,Y).
Figure 2 shows P(U,Y) as a function of Y for several values
of U. Since U = 1 corresponds to the case where the maximum
range of the hiders is equal to the sector radius, all values
of U > 1 follow the same curve as for U = 1 . The curves
in Figure 2 are equivalent to:
(1) Let V = 1 - \/l- U
2
Case 1: for Y <_ V /6 , P(U,Y) = 1 - /2Y/3
(2) 2 2Case 2: for Y > V /6, P(U,Y) = V/(Y + U /2)









ILLUSTRATING A HIDER PATH AND A SHADED SEEKER DENSITY
It





































= 50 00 mi
= 1000 mi
= (25 hr holding time) (10 sq mi/hr search rate)
5
= 25 x 10 sq mi
0=1 radian
Then Y = .1, U = .2, and V = .0 2. This is Case 2,
and P(U,Y) = .164. If r were "very large," we would have\ / max
P(U,Y) = 1/6.
The optimal strategy for the hiders is to pick an angle
at random and a range from the distribution F(urmax ), where




for < u < V
for V < u < U
,
and where V is as earlier defined. Qualitatively, the hider
have a tendency to pick large ranges, with Vr being
the smallest range picked.
Let y(u) be the density of seeker effort at range
ur , let T = v^Y, and let K = (Y + U 2/2)/[V(l - V/3) ] .max




for u < T
for u > T
(6) Case 2 y(u) = <
K /v/u ~ 1 for u £ V
K - 1 for u > V
Qualitatively, the searchers have a tendency to cluster near
2
the apex, particularly in Case 1, (Y V /6) . The density
is actually unbounded near the apex; that is, lim
_
~ y(u) = =°
The proof that the functions given above represent
the value of the game and the optimal strategies for the two
sides is the subject of the next section.
Exact Statement of the Problem
Let u be range from the apex measured in units of
r , so that the hiders must pick a range u for each tour
max r
in the interval [0,U]. Let F(v) be the C.D.F. used by the
hiders. Then the hiders spend G(u) of their time within u
of the apex, where
(7) G(u) = F(u) + u(l - F(u) ) .
Formula (7) is true because a hider will be within u of
the apex throughout its patrol period if it picks a range
smaller than or equal to u, and will spend a fraction u of
its patrol time within u of the apex even if it picks a
range greater than u. F(u) can be any C.D.F. defined on
[0,U], but G(u) cannot, which is what makes the problem non-
trivial .
Since y(u) is the density of seeker effort at range u,
the escape probability for a hider averaged over time is
U
i
(8) A(F,y) = / (1 + y(u) ) X dG(u) ,
where
U
(9) / y(u) u du = Y and y(u) >
Equations (7), (8), and (9) define a two-person zero sum game
where the hiders select a C.D.F. F(u) on [0,U] and the
seekers select y(u) according to (9) . We next show that




The results shown below were discovered by using the
theory of optimal control, but we will prove that the game
has been solved by showing that the solution offered is a
saddle point. While this is analytically simpler, it will
not motivate the results.
We must show that
max A(F,v*) = P(U,Y) = min A(F*,y)
,
F y





= F*(u) + u(l - F*(u)). Using (1) and (4),







for u < V
for V < u < U
Let g(u) = (d/du)G (u) . Then we have
U
A(F*,y) = / g(u)/(l + y(u)) du ,
where
g(u) =
1 for u < V




r^rW + * u y^ du ,
which is to be minimized subject to y(u)
_> 0. We minimize
for each u separately by differentiation, obtaining the
minimizing function y:
y(u) = g(u)Xu >)*
where + indicates that y(u) is to be rather than negative
If XV < 1, y(u) > for all u, and
u








= /X/V | V2 + (U2 - V 2 )/2
= /VV [V2/6 + U 2/2]
If y is to be feasible, we must also have
(11)
U ^ V U
Y = / uy(u)du = / /~u7T du + / —H— du - U 2/2
V / XV
= —^- [V2 /6 + U2/2] - U 2/2
/Tv
10
Since U2 + V 2 = 2V, V 2/6 + U 2/2 = V(l - V/3) . Solving
(11) for /T and then substituting /T in (10) , we obtain
A(F*,y) = P(U,Y), and also AV < 1 if and only if Y > V 2/6
.
If AV
_> 1, y(u) = for u >_ 1/X. Let T = 1/A. Then
(12) A(F*,y) = / /Tu du+l-T=l- T/3 ,
and if y is to be feasible we must have
T
(13) Y = / u(/l/Au - l)du = 2T 2 /3 - T 2 /2 = T 2 /6
Solving (13) for T and substituting in (12) , we obtain
A(F*,y) = P(U,Y), and also XV
_> 1 if and only if Y <_ V /6 .
According to Everett's theorem [1] on Lagrange multipliers,
A(F*,y) >_ A(F*,y) , so we have shown that P(U,Y) = min A(F*,y) .
We also note that y = y*.
Proof that P(U,Y) = max A(F,y*)
F
Since y*(u) is dif ferentiable , we can integrate




1 ^ yi (J) " / G(u) B(u)du ,
B(u) = - (^ y*(u)j/(l + y*(u)) 2 .
11
In both Cases I and II, B(u) _> for u £ V, and B(u) =0
for u > V (note T < V in (5) ) . Since G(u) = u + F(u) (1-u) > u,
A(F 'y*» 1 1 + vmu) - / ^(ujdu
But it is also true that g*( u ) = u f°r u <_ V, so
A(F,y*) A(F*,y*) for any F. But we already know
A(F*,y*) = P(U,Y), so the proof is complete.
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